Banks lay close to Sigel. Each of these
officers commanded an army corps of two divisions. Of McDowell's army
corps, Ricketts' division held Warrenton, twenty-five miles east of
Banks; while King's division was retained at Fredericksburg, forty
miles south-east of Ricketts'. Such dispersion seemed to invite
attack. Lee, however, found it impossible to comply with his
lieutenant's request for such aid as would enable him to assume the
offensive. The army covering Richmond was much smaller than
McClellan's, and the Confederates were aware that a large
reinforcement for the latter, under General Burnside, had landed in
the Peninsula. But assistance was promised in case Pope advanced so
far south that troops could be detached without risk to Richmond.
Pope, in fact, was too far off, and Jackson was to entice him forward.
A week, however, passed away without any movement on the part of
McClellan. He knew that Lee's army was diminished; and it was
believed at his headquarters that "Jackson had started towards the
Valley with 60,000 to 80,000 troops."* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page
334.) He knew that there was no large force within ten miles of his
outposts, and if the President would send him 20,000 or 30,000 more
men he said that he was ready to march on Richmond. But, as yet, he
had not observed the opportunity for which, according to his own
account, he was so carefully watching. Pope was far more
enterprising. His cavalry had burned the railway depot at Beaver Dam,
destroyed some Confederate stores, cut the line at several points,
and threatened Hanover Junction. Stuart, with his cavalry division,
was immediately sent northwards, and Lee ordered A.P. Hill to
Gordonsville.
Jackson's letters to headquarters at this period are missing. But
Lee's answers indicate the tenor of the views therein expressed. On
July 27 the Commander-in-Chief wrote:--
"I have received your dispatch of the 26th instant. I will send A.P.
Hill's division and the Second Brigade of Louisiana volunteers to
you...I want Pope to be suppressed...A.P. Hill you will, I think,
find a good officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with
your division commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be
saved you in arranging details, and they can act more intelligently.
I wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command. Cache
your troops as much as possible till you can strike your blow, and be
prepared to return to me when done, if n
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