dour. But Halleck
forbade him to advance further than the Rapidan, where Burnside would
reinforce him; and McClellan was ordered to hasten the departure of
his troops from the Peninsula.
Jackson's tactics have been criticised as severely as his strategy.
Because his first line was broken it is asserted that he narrowly
escaped a serious defeat, and that had the two forces been equally
matched Banks would have won a decisive victory. This is hardly sound
criticism. In the first place, Jackson was perfectly well aware that
the two forces were not equally matched. If he had had no more men
than Banks, would he have disposed his forces as he did? He would
scarcely have occupied the same extent of ground with 9000 men that
he did with 20,000. His actual front, when Banks attacked, was two
miles long. With smaller numbers he would have occupied a smaller
front, and would have retained a sufficient force in reserve. In the
second place, it is generally possible for an inferior force, if it
puts every man into the fighting-line, to win some measure of
success. But such success, as was shown at Kernstown, can seldom be
more than temporary; and if the enemy makes good use of his reserves
must end in defeat.
So far from Jackson's tactics being indifferent, it is very easy to
show that they were exactly the contrary. Immediately he came upon
the field he sent Ewell to occupy Slaughter Mountain, a mile distant
from his line of march; and the huge hill, with batteries planted on
its commanding terraces, not only secured his flank, but formed a
strong pivot for his attack on the Federal right. The preliminary
operations were conducted with due deliberation. There was no rushing
forward to the attack while the enemy's strength was still uncertain.
The ridge occupied by the enemy, so far as possible, was thoroughly
reconnoitred, and every rifled gun was at once brought up. The
artillery positions were well selected, for, notwithstanding their
superiority of ordnance, the Federal batteries suffered far more
heavily than the Confederates. The one weak point was the extreme
left, and to this point Jackson in person directed the attention of
his subordinates. "Had reinforcements," says Colonel Garnett, who
commanded the troops that first gave way, "momentarily expected,
arrived ten minutes sooner no disaster would have happened."* (* O.R.
volume 12 part 2 page 201.) That the point was not strengthened, that
the Stonewall Brigade was no
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