the direction
of his retreat at all clear. Was he aiming for some point on the
lower James where he might embark and get away? or at some point on
the upper James--say Shirley, or Bermuda Hundred--where he could
cross the river (he had pontoons and gunboats) and advance on
Richmond from the south? Such were the questions which came up, and
at length it was decided that the army should make no movement until
further information had been received. The enemy was not to be
pursued until Stuart's cavalry, which had arrived the previous
evening at Nance's Shop, should obtain reliable information.

"Jackson, meanwhile, sat silent in his corner. I watched his face.
The expression, changing from surprise to dissent, and lastly to
intense mortification, showed clearly the tenor of his thoughts. He
knew that McClellan was defeated, that he was retreating and not
manoeuvring. He knew that his troops were disorganised, that
sleeplessness, fasting, bad weather, and disaster must have weakened
their morale. He heard it said by General Lee that the scouts
reported the roads so deep in mud that the artillery could not move,
that our men were wet and wearied. But Jackson's mind reasoned that
where the Federals could march the Confederates could follow, and
that a decisive victory was well worth a great effort."* (* Letter to
the author. Dr. McGuire writes to the same effect.)

July 3.

The decision of the council of war was that the army should move the
next morning in the direction of Harrison's Landing. Longstreet,
whose troops had not been engaged at Malvern Hill, was to lead the
way. But the operations of this day were without result. The line of
march was by Carter's Mill and the river road. But after the troops
had been set in motion, it was found that the river road had been
obstructed by the enemy, and Lee directed Longstreet to countermarch
to the Charles City cross roads and move on Evelington Heights.* (*
Evelington Heights are between Rawling's Mill Pond and Westover.) But
ignorance of the country and inefficient guides once more played into
the enemy's hands, and when night closed the troops were still some
distance from the Federal outposts.

The delay had been exceedingly unfortunate. At 9 A.M. Stuart's
cavalry had occupied the Evelington Heights, and, believing that
Longstreet was close at hand, had opened fire with a single howitzer
on the camps below. The consternation caused by this unlooked-for
attack was great