record of it is to be found, and Jackson never mentioned, either at
the time or afterwards, what its purport was. His surviving staff
officers, however, are unanimous in declaring that he must have
received direct instructions from General Lee. "Is it possible,"
writes Dr. McGuire, "that Jackson, who knew nothing of the country,
and little of the exact situation of affairs, would have taken the
responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour for an hour or more,
unless he had had the authority of General Lee to do so? I saw him
that morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was sitting on a
log, and Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently giving him
instructions for the day." In his report (O.R. volume 11 part 1 page
492) Lee says: "The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily
expected; it was supposed that his approach would cause the enemy's
extension in that direction.") "Hoping," he says in his report, "that
Generals A.P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals
towards me, I directed General D.H. Hill to move his division to the
left of the wood, so as to leave between him and the wood on the
right an open space, across which I hoped that the enemy would be
driven." But Lee was deceived. The Federal line of retreat ran not to
the White House, but over Grapevine Bridge. McClellan had for some
time foreseen that he might be compelled to abandon the York River
Railway, and directly he suspected that Jackson was marching to
Richmond had begun to transfer his line of operations from the York
to the James, and his base of supply from the White House to
Harrison's Landing.

So vast is the amount of stores necessary for the subsistence,
health, and armament of a host like McClellan's that a change of base
is an operation which can only be effected under the most favourable
circumstances.* (* The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and
25,000 animals. 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and
other supplies had to be forwarded each day from White House to the
front; and at one time during the operations from fifty to sixty
days' rations for the entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons,
were accumulated at the depot. 5 tons daily per 1000 men is a fair
estimate for an army operating in a barren country.) It is evident,
then, that the possibility of the enemy shifting his line of
operations to the James, abandoning the York River Railroad, might
easily have escaped the penetration