troops in safe cover, from
which they never stirred;" of "regiment after regiment rushing back
in utter disorder;" of others which it was impossible to rally; and
of troops retiring in confusion, who cried out to the reinforcements,
"You need not go in; we are whipped, we can't do anything!" It is
only fair to say that the reinforcements replied, "Get out of our
way, we will show you how to do it;"* (* Reports of Whiting, Trimble,
Rodes, Bradley T. Johnson, O.R. volume 11 part 1.) but it is not to
be disguised that the Confederates at one time came near defeat. With
another division in reserve at the critical moment, Porter might have
maintained his line unbroken. His troops, had they been supported,
were still capable of resistance.

McClellan, however, up to the time the battle was lost, had sent but
one division (Slocum's) and two batteries to Porter's support. 66,000
Federals, on the south bank of the Chickahominy, had been held in
their intrenchments, throughout the day, by the demonstrations of
28,000 Confederates. Intent on saving his trains, on securing his
retreat to the river James, and utterly regardless of the chances
which fortune offered, the "Young Napoleon" had allowed his rearguard
to be overwhelmed. He was not seen on the plateau which his devoted
troops so well defended, nor even at the advanced posts on the
further bank of the Chickahominy. So convinced was he of the accuracy
of the information furnished by his detective staff that he never
dreamt of testing the enemy's numbers by his own eyesight. Had he
watched the development of Lee's attack, noted the small number of
his batteries, the long delay in the advance of the supports, the
narrow front of his line of battle, he would have discovered that the
Confederate strength had been greatly exaggerated. There were
moments, too, during the fight when a strong counterstroke, made by
fresh troops, would have placed Lee's army in the greatest peril. But
a general who thinks only of holding his lines and not of
annihilating the enemy is a poor tactician, and McClellan's lack of
enterprise, which Lee had so accurately gauged, may be inferred from
his telegram to Lincoln: "I have lost this battle because my force is
too small."* (* Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War.)

Porter was perhaps a more than sufficient substitute for the
Commander-in-Chief. His tactics, as fighting a waiting battle, had
been admirable; and, when his front was broken,