ed in a greater or less degree to nearly
all professional armies, the chance of mistakes has been much
reduced. The staff is no longer casually educated and selected
haphazard; the peace training of both officers and men is far more
thorough; and those essential details on which the most brilliant
conceptions, tactical and strategical, depend for success stand much
less chance of being overlooked than in 1815. It is by the standard
of a modern army, and not of those whose only school in peace was the
parade-ground, that the American armies must be judged.

That Jackson's tactical skill, and his quick eye for ground, had much
to do with his victories can hardly be questioned. At Kernstown and
Port Republic he seized the key of the position without a moment's
hesitation. At Winchester, when Ewell was checked upon the right,
three strong brigades, suddenly thrown forward on the opposite flank,
completely rolled up the Federal line. At Cross Keys the position
selected for Ewell proved too formidable for Fremont, despite his
superiority in guns. At Port Republic, Taylor's unexpected approach
through the tangled forest was at once decisive of the engagement.
The cavalry charge at Front Royal was admirably timed; and the manner
in which Ashby was employed throughout the campaign, not only to
screen the advance but to check pursuit, was a proof of the highest
tactical ability. Nor should the quick insight into the direction of
Shields' march on June 1, and the destruction of the bridges by which
he could communicate with Fremont, be omitted. It is true that the
operations in the Valley were not absolutely faultless. When Jackson
was bent on an effective blow his impatience to bring the enemy to
bay robbed him more than once of complete success. On the march to
M'Dowell Johnson's brigade, the advanced guard, had been permitted to
precede the main body by seven miles, and, consequently, when Milroy
attacked there was not sufficient force at hand for a decisive
counterstroke. Moreover, with an ill-trained staff a careful
supervision was most essential, and the waggon bridge at Port
Republic should have been inspected by a trustworthy staff officer
before Winder rushed across to fall on Tyler.

Errors of this nature, however instructive they may be to the student
of war, are but spots upon the sun; and in finding in his subordinate
such breadth of view and such vigour of execution, Lee was fortunate
indeed. Jackson was no less fo