events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a
letter to the author, writes as follows:--"Here we had a disastrous
illustration of the lack of an organised and intelligent general
staff. Let my predicament serve as a specimen. As chief of Jackson's
staff, I had two assistant adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer
department, and two clerks. What did I have for orderlies and
couriers? A detail from some cavalry company which happened to
bivouac near. The men were sent to me without any reference to their
local knowledge, their intelligence, or their courage; most probably
they were selected for me by their captain on account of their lack
of these qualities. Next to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the
General Staff should be the best man in the country. The brains of an
army should be in the General Staff. The lowest orderlies attached to
it should be the very best soldiers in the service, for education,
intelligence, and courage. Jackson had to find his own guide for his
march from Beaver Dam Station. He had not been furnished with a map,
and not a single orderly or message reached him during the whole
day.") It may be remarked, too, that Generals Branch and Ewell,
following converging roads, met near Shady Grove Church about 3 P.M.
No report appears to have been sent by the latter to General A.P.
Hill; and although Branch a little later received a message to the
effect that Hill had crossed the Chickahominy and was moving on
Mechanicsville,* (* Branch's Report, O.R. volume 2 part 2 page 882.)
the information was not passed on to Jackson.

Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to arrange a
simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment
of Hill and Jackson. In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek
there was no co-operation whatever. Hill attacked and was repulsed.
Jackson had halted at Hundley's Corner, three miles distant from the
battle-field. Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill
moved against their front an easy success would in all probability
have been the result.

Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill's defeat cannot be held to
rest on Jackson's shoulders. On August 18, 1870, the Prussian Guards
and the Saxon Army Corps were ordered to make a combined attack on
the village of St. Privat, the Guards moving against the front, the
Saxons against the flank. When the order was issued the two corps
were not more than two miles apart. The tract of country whi