e nearly
fifteen miles apart. Intercommunication at the outset was ensured by
the brigade under Branch; but as the advance progressed, and the
enemy was met with, it became more difficult. The messengers riding
from one force to the other were either stopped by the Federals, or
were compelled to make long detours; and as they approached the
enemy's position, neither Hill nor Jackson was informed of the
whereabouts of the other.

The truth is, that the arrangements made by the Confederate
headquarter staff were most inadequate. In the first place, the order
of the 24th, instructing Jackson to start from Slash Church at 3 A.M.
on the 26th, and thus leading the other generals to believe that he
would certainly be there at that hour, should never have been issued.
When it was written Jackson's advanced guard was at Beaver Dam
Station, the rear brigades fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash
Church his force had to march forty miles through an intricate
country, in possession of the enemy, and so little known that it was
impossible to designate the route to be followed. To fix an hour of
arrival so long in advance was worse than useless, and Jackson cannot
be blamed if he failed to comply with the exact letter of a foolish
order. As it was, so many of the bridges were broken, and so
difficult was it to pass the fords, that if Dr. Dabney had not found
in his brother, a planter of the neighbourhood, an efficient
substitute for the guide headquarters should have provided, the
Valley army would have been not hours but days too late. In the
second place, the duty of keeping up communications should not have
been left to Jackson, but have been seen to at headquarters. Jackson
had with him only a few cavalry, and these few had not only to supply
the necessary orderlies for the subordinate generals, and the escorts
for the artillery and trains, but to form his advanced guard, for
Stuart's squadrons were on his left flank, and not in his front.
Moreover, his cavalry were complete strangers to the country, and
there were no maps. In such circumstances the only means of ensuring
constant communication was to have detached two of Stuart's
squadrons, who knew the ground, to establish a series of posts
between Jackson's line of march and the Chickahominy; and to have
detailed a staff officer, whose sole duty would have been to furnish
the Commander-in-Chief with hourly reports of the progress made, to
join the Valley army.* (* Of the