delay would have given him a fine opportunity. More than one
course would have been open to him. He might have constructed
formidable intrenchments on the north bank of the Chickahominy and
have brought over large reinforcements of men and guns; or he might
have turned the tables by a bold advance on Richmond. It was by no
means inconceivable that if he detected Lee's intention and was given
time to prepare, he might permit the Confederates to cross the
Chickahominy, amuse them there with a small force, and hurl the rest
of his army on the works which covered the Southern capital. It is
true that his caution was extreme, and to a mind which was more
occupied with counting the enemy's strength than with watching for an
opportunity, the possibility of assuming the offensive was not likely
to occur. But, timid as he might be when no enemy was in sight,
McClellan was constitutionally brave; and when the chimeras raised by
an over-active imagination proved to be substantial dangers, he was
quite capable of daring resolution. Time, therefore, was of the
utmost importance to the Confederates. It was essential that Porter
should be overwhelmed before McClellan realised the danger; and if
Jackson, in fixing a date for the attack which would put a heavy tax
on the marching powers of his men, already strained to the utmost,
ran some risks, from a strategical point of view those risks were
fully justified.

In the second place, an operation such as that which Lee had devised
is one of the most difficult manoeuvres which an army can be called
upon to execute. According to Moltke, to unite two forces on the
battle-field, starting at some distance apart, at the right moment,
is the most brilliant feat of generalship. The slightest hesitation
may ruin the combination. Haste is even more to be dreaded. There is
always the danger that one wing may attack, or be attacked, while the
other is still far distant, and either contingency may be fatal. The
Valley campaign furnishes more than one illustration. In their
pursuit of Jackson, Shields and Fremont failed to co-operate at
Strasburg, at Cross Keys, and at Port Republic. And greater generals
than either Shields or Fremont have met with little better success in
attempting the same manoeuvre. At both Eylau and Bautzen Napoleon was
deprived of decisive victory by his failure to ensure the
co-operation of his widely separated columns.

Jackson and A.P. Hill, on the morning of the 26th, wer