ble, marching with Ewell, heard both musketry and
artillery; and in his opinion the command should have moved forward;*
(* Trimble's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 614.) and whatever
may have been Jackson's orders, it was undoubtedly his duty, if he
believed a hot engagement was in progress, to have marched to the
assistance of his colleagues. He could not help them by standing
still. He might have rendered them invaluable aid by pressing the
enemy in flank. But the question is, What inference did the cannonade
convey to Jackson's mind? Was it of such a character as to leave no
doubt that Hill was in close action, or might it be interpreted as
the natural accompaniment of the passage of the Chickahominy? The
evidence is conflicting. On the one hand we have the evidence of
Whiting and Trimble, both experienced soldiers; on the other, in
addition to the indirect evidence of Jackson's inaction, we have the
statement of Major Dabney. "We heard no signs," says the chief of the
staff, "of combat on Beaver Dam Creek until a little while before
sunset. The whole catastrophe took place in a few minutes about that
time; and in any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac, could
not have been reassembled, formed up, and moved forward in time to be
of any service. A night attack through the dense, pathless, and
unknown forest was quite impracticable."* (* Letter to the author.)
It seems probable, then--and the Federal reports are to the same
effect* (* Porter's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 222. Battles
and Leaders volume 2 page 330.)--that the firing was only really
heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson believed it to be
occasioned by Hill's passage of the Chickahominy, and the rout of the
Federals from Mechanicsville. Neither Trimble nor Whiting were aware
that Lee's orders directed that the operation was to be covered by a
heavy cannonade.
Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it difficult to
believe that others did not do the same. He knew that the position he
had taken up rendered the line of Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the
Federals. They would never stand to fight on that line with a strong
force established in their rear and menacing their communications,
nor would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the trackless
woods. It might confidently be assumed, therefore, that they would
fall back during the night, and that the Confederate advance would
then be carried out in that
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