The main body will be
held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left.
General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of
the enemy on his left, and will cooperate with him in his advance."

June 25.

On the 25th Longstreet and the two Hills moved towards the bridges;
and although during the movement McClellan drove back Magruder's
pickets to their trenches, and pushed his own outposts nearer
Richmond, Lee held firmly to his purpose. As a matter of fact, there
was little to be feared from McClellan. With a profound belief in the
advantages of defensive and in the strength of a fortified position,
he expected nothing less than that the Confederates would leave the
earthworks they had so laboriously constructed, and deliberately risk
the perils of an attack. He seems to have had little idea that in the
hands of a skilful general intrenchments may form a "pivot of
operations,"* (* The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee's
report. "It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so
as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the
other part free to operate on the north bank." O.R. volume 11 part 1
page 490.) the means whereby he covers his most vulnerable point,
holds the enemy in front, and sets his main body free for offensive
action. Yet McClellan was by no means easy in his mind. He knew
Jackson was approaching. He knew his communications were threatened.
Fugitive negroes, who, as usual, either exaggerated or lied, had
informed him that the Confederates had been largely reinforced, and
that Beauregard, with a portion of the Western army, had arrived in
Richmond. But that his right wing was in danger he had not the
faintest suspicion. He judged Lee by himself. Such a plan as leaving
a small force to defend Richmond, and transferring the bulk of the
army to join Jackson, he would have at once rejected as over-daring.
If attack came at all, he expected that it would come by the south
bank; and he was so far from anticipating that an opportunity for
offensive action might be offered to himself that, on the night of
the 25th, he sent word to his corps commanders that they were to
regard their intrenchments as "the true field of battle."* (* O.R.
volume 11 part 3 page 252.)

June 26. 3 A.M.

Lee's orders left much to Jackson. The whole operation which Lee had
planned hinged upon his movements. On the morning of the 24th he was
at Beaver Dam Statio