rtunate when Ashby came under his
command. That dashing captain of free-lances was undoubtedly a most
valuable colleague. It was something to have a cavalry leader who
could not only fight and reconnoitre, but who had sagacity enough to
divine the enemy's intentions. But the ideas that governed the
employment of the cavalry were Jackson's alone. He it was who placed
the squadrons across Fremont's road from Wardensville, who ordered
the demonstrations against Banks, before both M'Dowell and Front
Royal, and those which caused Fremont to retreat after Port Republic.
More admirable still was the quickness with which he recognised the
use that might be made of mounted riflemen. From the Potomac to Port
Republic his horsemen covered his retreat, dismounting behind every
stream and along the borders of every wood, checking the pursuers
with their fire, compelling them to deploy their infantry, and then
retreating rapidly to the next position. Day after day were the
Federal advanced guards held in check, their columns delayed, and the
generals irritated by their slippery foe. Meanwhile, the Confederate
infantry, falling back at their leisure, were relieved of all
annoyance. And if the cavalry was suddenly driven in, support was
invariably at hand, and a compact brigade of infantry, supported by
artillery, sent the pursuing horsemen to the right-about. The retreat
of the Valley army was managed with the same skill as its advance,
and the rear-guard tactics of the campaign are no less remarkable
than those of the attack.

To judge from the Valley campaign, Jackson handled his horsemen with
more skill than any other commander, Confederate or Federal. A
cavalry that could defend itself on foot as well as charge in the
saddle was practically a new arm, of far greater efficiency than
cavalry of the old type, and Jackson at once recognised, not only its
value; but the manner in which it could be most effectively employed.
He was not led away by the specious advantages, so eagerly urged by
young and ambitious soldiers, of the so-called raids. Even Lee
himself, cool-headed as he was, appears to have been fascinated by
the idea of throwing a great body of horsemen across his enemy's
communications, spreading terror amongst his supply trains, cutting
his telegraphs, and destroying his magazines. In hardly a single
instance did such expeditions inflict more than temporary discomfort
on the enemy; and the armies were led more than once in