overwhelming force on the north bank; and this could hardly be done
without so weakening the force which held the Richmond lines that it
would be unable to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it.
If McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw forward the
great army he had on the south bank, the rebel capital might be the
reward of his resolution. The danger was apparent to all, but Lee
resolved to risk it, and his audacity has not escaped criticism. It
has been said that he deliberately disregarded the contingency of
McClellan either advancing on Richmond, or reinforcing Porter. The
truth is, however, that neither Lee, nor those generals about him who
knew McClellan, were in the least apprehensive that their
over-cautious adversary, if the attack were sudden and well
sustained, would either see or utilise his opportunity.

From Hannibal to Moltke there has been no great captain who has
neglected to study the character of his opponent, and who did not
trade on the knowledge thus acquired, and it was this knowledge which
justified Lee's audacity.

The real daring of the enterprise lay in the inferiority of the
Confederate armament. Muskets and shot-guns, still carried by a large
part of the army, were ill-matched against rifles of the most modern
manufacture; while the smooth-bore field-pieces, with which at least
half the artillery was equipped, possessed neither the range nor the
accuracy of the rifled ordnance of the Federals.

That Lee's study of the chances had not been patient and exhaustive
it is impossible to doubt. He was no hare-brained leader, but a
profound thinker, following the highest principles of the military
art. That he had weighed the disconcerting effect which the sudden
appearance of the victorious Jackson, with an army of unknown
strength, would produce upon McClellan, goes without saying. He had
omitted no precaution to render the surprise complete, and although
the defences of Richmond were still too weak to resist a resolute
attack, Magruder, the same officer who had so successfully imposed
upon McClellan at Yorktown, was such a master of artifice that, with
28,000 men and the reserve artillery,* (* Magruder's division,
13,000; Huger's division, 9000; reserve artillery, 3000; 5 regiments
of cavalry, 2000. Holmes' division, 6500, was still retained on the
south bank of the James.) he might be relied upon to hold Richmond
until Porter had been disposed of. The remainder of