rent from those existing with us...I can but leave to conjecture
how the Germans would have got along on bottomless roads--often none
at all--through the swamps and quicksands of Northern
Virginia."--Memoirs. volume 2 page 450.)
Jackson's rules for marching have been preserved. "He never broke
down his men by long-continued movement. He rested the whole column
very often, but only for a few minutes at a time. He liked to see the
men lie flat on the ground to rest, and would say, "A man rests all
over when he lies down.""* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 297,
298.) Nor did he often call upon his troops for extraordinary
exertions. In the period between his departure from Elk Run Mountain
to the battle of Port Republic there were only four series of forced
marches.* (* From April 17 to April 19, when he moved to Elk Run
Valley; May 6 to May 8, when he moved against Milroy; May 18 to May
25, when he moved against Banks; and May 29 to June 1, when he passed
south between Fremont and Shields.) "The hardships of forced
marches," he said, "are often more painful than the dangers of
battle." It was only, in short, when he intended a surprise, or when
a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything to
speed. The troops marched light, carrying only rifles, blankets,
haversacks, and ammunition. When long distances were to be covered,
those men who still retained their knapsacks were ordered to leave
them behind. No heavy trains accompanied the army. The ambulances and
ammunition waggons were always present; but the supply waggons were
often far in rear. In their haversacks the men carried several days'
rations; and when these were consumed they lived either on the
farmers, or on the stores they had captured from the enemy.
It is not to be supposed, however, that the ranks remained full. "I
had rather," said Jackson, "lose one man in marching than five in
fighting," and to this rule he rigorously adhered. He never gave the
enemy warning by a deliberate approach along the main roads; and if
there was a chance of effecting a surprise, or if the enemy was
already flying, it mattered little how many men fell out. And fall
out they did, in large numbers. Between May 17 and the battle of
Cross Keys the army was reduced from 16,500 men to 18,000. Not more
than 500 had been killed or wounded, so there were no less than 3000
absentees. Many were footsore and found no place in the ambulances.
Many were sick; others on
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