t which crossed his path.
It is when regarded in connection with the operations of the main
armies that the Valley campaign stands out in its true colours; but,
at the same time, even as an isolated incident, it is in the highest
degree interesting. It has been compared, and not inaptly, with the
Italian campaign of 1796. And it may even be questioned whether, in
some respects, it was not more brilliant. The odds against the
Confederates were far greater than against the French. Jackson had to
deal with a homogeneous enemy, with generals anxious to render each
other loyal support, and not with the contingents of different
States. His marches were far longer than Napoleon's. The theatre of
war was not less difficult. His troops were not veterans, but, in
great part, the very rawest of recruits. The enemy's officers and
soldiers were not inferior to his own; their leaders were at least
equal in capacity to Colli, Beaulieu, and Alvinzi, and the statesmen
who directed them were not more purblind than the Aulic Council.
Moreover, Jackson was merely the commander of a detached force, which
might at any moment be required at Richmond. The risks which Napoleon
freely accepted he could not afford. He dared not deliver battle
unless he were certain of success, and his one preoccupation was to
lose as few men as possible. But be this as it may, in the secrecy of
the Confederate movements, the rapidity of the marches, and the
skilful use of topographical features, the Valley campaign bears
strong traces of the Napoleonic methods. Seldom has the value of
these methods been more forcibly illustrated. Three times was
McDowell to have marched to join McClellan: first, at the beginning
of April, when he was held back by Kernstown; second, on May 26, when
he was held back by Front Royal and Winchester; third, on June 25,
when he was held back by Jackson's disappearance after Port Republic.
Above all, the campaign reveals a most perfect appreciation of the
surest means of dealing with superior numbers. "In my personal
intercourse with Jackson," writes General Imboden, "in the early part
of the war, he often said that there were two things never to be lost
sight of by a military commander. "Always mystify, mislead, and
surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome
him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to
follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken,
and can then be de
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