and I think this had a very important bearing on
his ability to promptly recognise the topographical features of the
country, and to recall them whenever it became necessary to make use
of them. He was quick in comprehending topographical features. I made
it a point, nevertheless, to be always ready to give him a graphic
representation of any particular point of the region where operations
were going on, making a rapid sketch of the topography in his
presence, and using different coloured pencils for greater clearness
in the definition of surface features. The carefully prepared map
generally had too many points of detail, and did not sufficiently
emphasise features apparently insignificant, but from a military
standpoint most important. I may add that Jackson not only studied
the general maps of the country, but made a particular study of those
of any district where he expected to march or fight, constantly using
sketch maps made upon the ground to inform him as to portions of the
field of operations that did not immediately come under his own
observation. I often made rough sketches for him when on the march,
or during engagements, in answer to his requests for information."*
(* Letter to the author.)
It is little wonder that it should have been said by his soldiers
that "he knew every hole and corner of the Valley as if he had made
it himself."
But to give attention to topography was not all that Jackson had
learned from Napoleon. "As a strategist," says Dabney, "the first
Napoleon was undoubtedly his model. He had studied his campaigns
diligently, and he was accustomed to remark with enthusiasm upon the
evidences of his genius. "Napoleon," he said, "was the first to show
what an army could be made to accomplish. He had shown what was the
value of time as an element of strategic combination, and that good
troops, if well cared for, could be made to march twenty-five miles
daily, and win battles besides." And he had learned more than this.
"We must make this campaign," he said at the beginning of 1868, "an
exceedingly active one. Only thus can a weaker country cope with a
stronger; it must make up in activity what it lacks in strength. A
defensive campaign can only be made successful by taking the
aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for his
adversary to become fully prepared, but struck him the first blow.""
It would perhaps be difficult, in the writings of Napoleon, to find a
passage which emb
|