ce of the capital and its approaches. But in the original
arrangement, with which the President had been satisfied, Williams
was to have been brought to Manassas, and Shields alone left in the
Shenandoah Valley. Under the new distribution the President found
that the force at Manassas would be decreased by two brigades; and,
at the same time, that while part of the troops McClellan had
promised were not forthcoming, a large portion of those actually
available were good for nothing. The officer left in command at
Washington reported that "nearly all his force was imperfectly
disciplined; that several of the regiments were in a very
disorganised condition; that efficient artillery regiments had been
removed from the forts, and that he had to relieve them with very new
infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that
arm."* (* Report of General Wadsworth; O.R. volume 12 part 3 page
225.) Lincoln submitted the question to six generals of the regular
army, then present in Washington; and these officers replied that, in
their opinion, "the requirement of the President that this city shall
be left entirely secure has not been fully complied with."* (* Letter
of Mr. Stanton; O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 726.)

On receiving this report, Lincoln ordered the First Army Corps,
37,000 strong, under General McDowell, to remain at Manassas in place
of embarking for the Peninsula; and thus McClellan, on the eve of his
advance on Richmond, found his original force of 150,000 reduced by
46,000 officers and men. Moreover, not content with detaching
McDowell for a time, Lincoln, the next day, assigned that general to
an independent command, covering the approaches to Washington; Banks,
also, was withdrawn from McClellan's control, and directed to defend
the Valley. The original dissemination of the Federal forces was thus
gravely accentuated, and the Confederates had now to deal with four
distinct armies, McClellan's, McDowell's, Banks', and Fremont's,
dependent for co-operation on the orders of two civilians, President
Lincoln and his Secretary of War. And this was not all. McDowell had
been assigned a most important part in McClellan's plan of invasion.
The road from Fortress Monroe was barred by the fortifications of
Yorktown. These works could be turned, however, by sending a force up
the York River. But the passage of the stream was debarred to the
Federal transports by a strong fort at Gloucester Point, on the left
ba