thout the power of reply.

In moving to Staunton the Confederate commander had three objects in
view:--

1. To strengthen his own force by combining with Edward Johnson.

2. To prevent the Federals combining by keeping Banks stationary and
defeating Milroy.

3. To protect Staunton.

The real danger that he had to guard against was that Banks, taking
advantage of his absence from the Valley, should move on Staunton.
Knowing his adversary as well as he did, he had no reason to
apprehend attack during his march to Port Republic. But it was not
impossible that when he found out that Jackson had vanished from the
Valley, Banks might take heart and join hands with Milroy. It was
necessary, therefore, in order to prevent Banks moving, that
Jackson's absence from the Valley should be very short; also, in
order to prevent Milroy either joining Banks or taking Staunton, that
Edward Johnson should be reinforced as rapidly as possible.

These objects would be attained by making use of the road to Port
Republic. In the first place, Banks would not dare to move towards
Milroy so long as the flank of his line of march was threatened; and
in the second place, from Port Republic to Staunton, by Mechum's
River, was little more than two days' march. Within forty-eight
hours, therefore, using the railway, it would be possible to
strengthen Johnson in time to protect Staunton, and to prevent the
Federals uniting. It was unlikely that Banks, even if he heard at
once that his enemy had vanished, would immediately dash forward; and
even if he did he would still have five-and-twenty miles to march
before he reached Staunton. Every precaution had been taken, too,
that he should not hear of the movement across the Blue Ridge till it
was too late to take advantage of it; and, as we have already seen,
so late as May 5 he believed that Jackson was at Harrisonburg. Ashby
had done his work well.

It might be argued, however, that with an antagonist so supine as
Banks Jackson might have openly marched to Staunton by the most
direct route; in fact, that he need never have left the Valley at
all. But, had he taken the road across the Valley, he would have
advertised his purpose. Milroy would have received long warning of
his approach, and all chance of effecting a surprise would have been
lost.

On April 29, the day on which Jackson began his movement, Richmond
was still safe. The Yorktown lines were intact, held by the 53,000
Confederates un