an order to fall back on Strasburg, and to transfer
Shields' division to General McDowell at Fredericksburg.

But on May 3, the day Jackson disappeared behind the Blue Ridge,
Banks, to his evident discomfiture, found that his adversary had not
retreated to Richmond after all. The dashing commander, just now so
anxious for one thing or the other, either to clear the Valley or to
sweep the country north of Gordonsville, disappeared. "The reduced,
demoralised" enemy assumed alarming proportions. Nothing was said
about his half-rations; and as Ewell had reached Swift Run Gap with a
force estimated at 12,000 men, while Jackson, according to the
Federal scouts, was still near Port Republic, Banks thought it
impossible to divide his force with safety.

Stanton's reply is not on record, but it seems that he permitted
Banks to retain Shields until he arrived at Strasburg; and on May 5
the Federals fell back to New Market, their commander, misled both by
his cavalry and his spies, believing that Jackson had marched to
Harrisonburg.

On the 7th, the day that Jackson moved west from Staunton, Banks'
fears again revived. He was still anxious that Shields should remain
with him. "Our cavalry," he said, "from near Harrisonburg report
to-night that Jackson occupies that town, and that he has been
largely reinforced. Deserters confirm reports of Jackson's movements
in this direction."

Jackson's movements at this juncture are full of interest. Friend and
foe were both mystified. Even his own officers might well ask why, in
his march to Staunton, he deliberately adopted the terrible road to
Port Republic. From Elk Run Valley a metalled road passed over the
Blue Ridge to Gordonsville. Staunton by this route was twenty-four
miles further than by Port Republic; but there were no obstacles to
rapid marching. And the command would have arrived no later than it
actually did. Moreover, in moving to Port Republic, eleven miles only
from Harrisonburg, and within sight of the enemy's patrols, it would
seem that there was considerable risk. Had Banks attacked the bridge
whilst the Confederate artillery was dragging heavily through the
mire, the consequences would probably have been unpleasant. Even if
he had not carried the bridge, the road which Jackson had chosen ran
for several miles over the open plain which lies eastward of the
Shenandoah, and from the commanding bluffs on the western bank his
column could have been effectively shelled wi