nsula, he had been able to advance at once upon Richmond, the
enemy must have concentrated for the defence of his capital, and
neither Banks nor Washington would have been disturbed. But the
moment his advance was checked, as it was at Yorktown, the enemy
could detach at his leisure in any direction that he pleased, and
McClellan was absolutely unable to support the threatened point. The
strategy of exterior lines demands, for success, a strong and
continuous pressure on the enemy's main army, depriving him of the
time and the space necessary for counterstroke. If this is
impossible, a skilful foe will at once make use of his central
position.

Lincoln appears to have had an instinctive apprehension that
McClellan might not be able to exert sufficient pressure to hold
Johnston fast, and it was for this reason that he had fought so
strongly against the Peninsula line of invasion. It was the
probability that the Confederates would use their opportunity with
which Stanton had now to deal, complicated by the fact that their
numbers were believed to be much greater than they really were. Still
the problem was not one of insurmountable difficulty. Banks and
Fremont united had 40,000 men, McDowell over 30,000. A few marches
would have brought these forces into combination. Banks and Fremont,
occupying Staunton, and moving on Gordonsville, would have soon taken
up communication with McDowell; an army 70,000 strong, far larger
than any force the Confederates could detach against it, would have
threatened Richmond from the north and west, and, at the same time,
would have covered Washington. This plan, though not without elements
of danger, offered some advantages. Nor were soldiers wanting to
advise it. Both Rosecrans and Shields had submitted schemes for such
a combination. Mr. Stanton, however, preferred to control the
chessboard by the light of unaided wisdom; and while McDowell was
unnecessarily strengthened, both Banks and Fremont were dangerously
weakened.

The only single point where the Secretary showed the slightest
sagacity was in apprehending that the Confederates would make use of
their opportunity, and overwhelm one of the detachments he had so
ingeniously isolated.

On April 29 Johnston proposed to Davis that his army should be
withdrawn from the Peninsula, and that the North should be invaded by
way of the Valley.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 477.) Lee, in the
name of the President, replied that some such s