ugh the passes of the North
Mountain, was ten miles east of Moorefield. Lee's instructions had
already been carried to the extreme point consistent with safety, and
Jackson determined to retreat by the Valley turnpike. Not only was it
the one road which was not yet closely threatened, but it was the one
road over which the enormous train of captured stores could be
rapidly withdrawn.* (* Jackson, although the harvest was in full
swing, had given orders that all waggons in the valley were to be
impressed and sent to Winchester and Martinsburg.)

May 29.

The next morning, therefore, the main body of the army marched back
to Winchester; Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade and two batteries,
remaining before Harper's Ferry to hold Saxton in check. Jackson
himself returned to Winchester by the railway, and on the way he was
met by untoward news. As the train neared Winchester a staff officer,
riding at a gallop across the fields, signalled it to stop, and the
general was informed that the 12th Georgia had been driven from Front
Royal, burning the stores, but not the bridges, at Front Royal, and
that Shields' division was in possession of the village.

The situation had suddenly become more than critical. Front Royal is
but twelve miles from Strasburg. Not a single Confederate battalion
was within five-and-twenty miles of that town, and Winder was just
twice as far away. The next morning might see the Valley turnpike
blocked by 10,000 Federals under Shields. Another 10,000, McDowell's
Second Division, under General Ord, were already near Front Royal;
Fremont, with 15,000, was pressing forward from the west; and Banks
and Saxton, with the same number, were moving south from the Potomac.
With resolute management it would seem that 35,000 Federals might
have been assembled round Strasburg by midday of the 31st, and that
this force might have been increased to 50,000 by the evening of June
1.* (* For the distribution of the different forces during this
period see Note at end of chapter.) Desperate indeed appeared the
Confederate chances. The waggons which conveyed the spoils of
Martinsburg and Charlestown were still at Winchester, and with them
were more than 2000 prisoners. With the utmost expedition it seemed
impossible that the Valley army, even if the waggons were abandoned,
could reach Strasburg before the evening of the 31st; and the
Stonewall Brigade, with fifty miles to march, would be
four-and-twenty hours later. Esc