my, posted in Brown's Gap, was now in direct
communication with Richmond. Not only had its pursuers been roughly
checked, but the sudden and unexpected counterstroke, delivered by an
enemy whom they believed to be in full flight, had surprised Lincoln
and Stanton as effectively as Shields and Fremont. On June 6, the day
Jackson halted near Port Republic, McCall's division of McDowell's
Army Corps, which had been left at Fredericksburg, had been sent to
the Peninsula by water; and two days later McDowell himself, with the
remainder of his force, was directed to join McClellan as speedily as
possible overland. Fremont, on the same date, was instructed to halt
at Harrisonburg, and Shields to march to Fredericksburg. But before
Stanton's dispatches reached their destination both Fremont and
Shields had been defeated, and the plans of the Northern Cabinet were
once more upset.
Instead of moving at once on Fredericksburg, and in spite of
McDowell's remonstrances, Shields was detained at Luray, and
Ricketts, who had succeeded Ord, at Front Royal; while Fremont,
deeming himself too much exposed at Harrisonburg, fell back to Mount
Jackson. It was not till June 20 that Ricketts and Shields were
permitted to leave the Valley, ten days after the order had been
issued for McDowell to move on Richmond. For that space of time,
then, his departure was delayed; and there was worse to come. The
great strategist at Richmond had not yet done with Lincoln. There was
still more profit to be derived from the situation; and from the
subsidiary operations in the Valley we may now turn to the main
armies.
By Jackson's brilliant manoeuvres McDowell had been lured westward at
the very moment he was about to join McClellan. The gap between the
two Federal armies had been widened from five to fifteen marches,
while Jackson at Brown's Gap was no more than nine marches distant
from Richmond. McClellan, moreover, had been paralysed by the vigour
of Jackson's blows.
On May 16, as already related, he had reached White House on the
Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate capital. Ten miles south,
and directly across his path, flowed the Chickahominy, a formidable
obstacle to the march of a large army.
On the 24th, having already been informed that he was to be
reinforced by McDowell, he was told that the movement of the latter
for Fredericksburg was postponed until the Valley had been cleared.
This change of plan placed him in a most awkward
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