and centre. When it was at last delivered, the attack
was piecemeal; and although successful in driving the enemy from his
intrenchments, it failed to drive him from the field. The Federals
fell back to a second line of earthworks, and were strongly
reinforced from beyond the river. During the battle Johnston himself
was severely wounded, and the command devolved on General G.W. Smith.
Orders were issued that the attack should be renewed next morning;
but for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained, only
five of the twenty-three brigades were actively engaged, and the
battle of Seven Pines ended with the unmolested retreat of the
Confederates. Smith fell sick, and General Lee was ordered by the
President to take command of the army in the field.

McClellan, thanks to the bad work of the Confederate staff at the
battle of Seven Pines, had now succeeded in securing the passages
across the Chickahominy. But for the present he had given up all idea
of an immediate advance. Two of his army corps had suffered severely,
both in men and in moral; the roads were practically impassable for
artillery; the bridges over the Chickahominy had been much injured by
the floods; and it was imperative to re-establish the communications.
Such is his own explanation of his inactivity; but his official
correspondence with the Secretary of War leaves no doubt that his
hope of being reinforced by McDowell was a still more potent reason.
During the first three weeks in June he received repeated assurances
from Mr. Stanton that large bodies of troops were on their way to
join him, and it was for these that he was waiting. This expectant
attitude, due to McDowell's non-arrival, entailed on him a serious
disadvantage. If he transferred his whole army to the right bank of
the Chickahominy, his line of supply, the railway to West Point,
would be exposed; and, secondly, when McDowell approached from
Fredericksburg, it would be possible for Leo to drive that general
back before the Army of the Potomac could give him direct support, or
in any case to cut off all communication with him. McClellan was
consequently compelled to retain his right wing north of the river;
and indeed in so doing he was only obeying his instructions. On May
18 Stanton had telegraphed: "You are instructed to co-operate so as
to establish this communication [with McDowell], by extending your
right wing north of Richmond."

The Federal army, then, whilst awaiting