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in vain to reunite his scattered divisions. Divining the true drift of the Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy. But his pleadings were disregarded. Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had learned nothing from the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and Fremont. Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till the 25th that McDowell's corps was once more concentrated at Fredericksburg. The Confederates had gained a start of five marches, and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the Valley. McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had preceded the march of Jackson's army, but he had given them scant credit. On the morning of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon his most vulnerable point--his right wing, which, in anticipation of McDowell's advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the Chickahominy. Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same day, when his outposts were falling back before superior numbers, and the Valley regiments were closing round their flank, he received a telegram from Stanton, informing him that the forces commanded by McDowell, Banks, and Fremont were to form one army under Major-General Pope; and that this army was "to attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, and threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville!" All hope of succour passed away, and the "Young Napoleon" was left to extricate himself as best he could, from his many difficulties; difficulties which were due in part to his own political blindness, in part to the ignorance of Lincoln, but, in a far larger degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and Jackson. NOTE The Marches in the Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862. Miles March 22 Mount Jackson-Strasburg 28 March 23 Strasburg-Kernstown-Newtown 18 Battle of Kernstown March 24-26 Newtown-Mt. Jackson 35 April 17-19 Mt. Jackson-Elk Run Valley 50 April 30-Ma
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