rsaries.* (* "If I were mindful
only of my own glory, I would choose always to make war in my own
country, for there every man is a spy, and the enemy can make no
movement of which I am not informed." Frederick the Great's
Instructions to his Generals.) But, except in these respects,
everything was against them. In mettle and in discipline the troops
were fairly matched. On both sides the higher commands, with few
exceptions, were held by regular officers, who had received the same
training. On both sides the staff was inexperienced. If the
Confederate infantry were better marksmen than the majority of the
Federals, they were not so well armed; and the Federal artillery,
both in materiel and in handling, was the more efficient.

The odds against the South were great; and to those who believed that
Providence sides with the big battalions, that numbers, armament,
discipline, and tactical efficiency, are all that is required to
ensure success, the fall of Richmond must have seemed inevitable.

But within three months of the day that McClellan started for the
Peninsula the odds had been much reduced. The Confederates had won no
startling victories. Except in the Valley, and there only small
detachments were concerned, the fighting had been indecisive. The
North had no reason to believe that her soldiers, save only the
cavalry, were in any way inferior to their adversaries. And yet, on
June 26, where were the "big battalions?" 105,000 men were intrenched
within sight of the spires of Richmond; but where were the rest?
Where were the 70,000* (* At the date of the action at Front Royal,
May 23, the following was the strength of the detached forces: Banks,
10,000; Fremont, 25,000; McDowell (including Shields, but excluding
McCall), 35,000.) that should have aided McClellan, have encircled
the rebel capital on every side, cut the communications, closed the
sources of supply, and have overwhelmed the starving garrison? How
came it that Fremont and Banks were no further south than they were
in March? that the Shenandoah Valley still poured its produce into
Richmond? that McDowell had not yet crossed the Rappahannock? What
mysterious power had compelled Lincoln to retain a force larger than
the whole Confederate army "to protect the national capital from
danger and insult?"

It was not hard fighting. The Valley campaign, from Kernstown to Port
Republic, had not cost the Federals more than 7000 men; and, with the
exception of C