the promised reinforcements,
was divided into two parts by a stream which another storm might
render impassable. It will thus be seen that Jackson's operations not
only deprived McClellan of the immediate aid of 40,000 men and 100
guns, but placed him in a most embarrassing situation. "The faulty
location of the Union army," says General Porter, commanding the
Fifth Federal Army Corps, "was from the first realised by General
McClellan, and became daily an increasing cause of care and anxiety;
not the least disturbing element of which was the impossibility of
quickly reinforcing his right wing or promptly withdrawing it to the
south bank."* (*Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 324.)

Seeing that the Confederates were no more than 60,000 strong, while
the invading army mustered 100,000, it would seem that the knot
should have been cut by an immediate attack on the Richmond lines.
But McClellan, who had been United States Commissioner in the Crimea,
knew something of the strength of earthworks; and moreover, although
the comparatively feeble numbers developed by the Confederates at
Seven Pines should have enlightened him, he still believed that his
enemy's army was far larger than his own. So, notwithstanding his
danger, he preferred to postpone his advance till Jackson's defeat
should set M'Dowell free.

Fatal was the mistake which retained McDowell's divisions in the
Valley, and sent Shields in pursuit of Jackson. While the Federal
army, waiting for reinforcements, lay astride the noisome swamps of
the Chickahominy, Lee was preparing a counterstroke on the largest
scale.

The first thing to do was to reduce the disparity of numbers; and to
effect this troops were to be brought up from the south, Jackson was
to come to Richmond, and McDowell was to be kept away. This last was
of more importance than the rest, and, at the same time, more
difficult of attainment. Jackson was certainly nearer to Richmond
than was McDowell; but to defeat McClellan would take some time, and
it was essential that Jackson should have a long start, and not
arrive upon the battlefield with McDowell on his heels. It was
necessary, therefore, that the greater part of the latter's force
should be detained on the Shenandoah; and on June 8, while Cross Keys
was being fought, Lee wrote to Jackson: "Should there be nothing
requiring your attention in the Valley, so as to prevent you leaving
it in a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive t