difficult for you to engage him in time to unite with this army in
the battle for Richmond. Fremont and Shields are apparently
retrograding, their troops shaken and disorganised, and some time
will be required to set them again in the field. If this is so, the
sooner you unite with this army the better. McClellan is being
strengthened...There is much sickness in his ranks, but his
reinforcements by far exceed his losses. The present, therefore,
seems to be favourable for a junction of your army and this. If you
agree with me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so the
better. In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it
was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the
Valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in
their front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the
Pamunkey. To be efficacious the movement must be secret. Let me know
the force you can bring, and be careful to guard from friends and
foes your purpose and your intention of personally leaving the
Valley. The country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately
carried to the enemy."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 913.)

The greater part of these instructions Jackson had already carried
out on his own initiative. There remained but to give final
directions to Colonel Munford, who was to hold the Valley, and to set
the army in motion. Munford was instructed to do his best to spread
false reports of an advance to the Potomac. Ewell's division was
ordered to Charlottesville. The rest of the Valley troops were to
follow Ewell; and Whiting and Lawton, who, in order to bewilder
Fremont, had been marched from Staunton to Mount Meridian, and then
back to Staunton, were to take train to Gordonsville. It was above
all things important that the march should be secret. Not only was it
essential that Lincoln should not be alarmed into reinforcing
McClellan, but it was of even more importance that McClellan should
not be alarmed into correcting the faulty distribution of his army.
So long as he remained with half his force on one bank of the
Chickahominy and half on the other, Lee had a fair chance of
concentrating superior numbers against one of the fractions. But if
McClellan, warned of Jackson's approach, were to mass his whole force
on one bank or the other, there would be little hope of success for
the Confederates.

The ultimate object of the movement was therefore revealed to no one,
and t