sed them by many miles. McDowell, hotly protesting, declared,
and rightly, that the movement he had been ordered to execute was
strategically false. "It is impossible," he said, "that Jackson can
have been largely reinforced. He is merely creating a diversion, and
the surest way to bring him from the lower Valley is for me to move
rapidly on Richmond. In any case, it would be wiser to move on
Gordonsville."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 pages 220, 229 (letter of S.
P. Chase).) His arguments were unavailing. But when Jackson pressed
forward to the Potomac, it became possible to intercept him, and the
President did all he could to assist his generals. He kept them
constantly informed of the movements of the enemy and of each other.
He left them a free hand, and with an opponent less able his
instructions would have probably brought about complete success. Nor
were the generals to blame. They failed to accomplish the task that
had been set them, and they made mistakes. But the task was
difficult; and, if at the critical moment the hazard of their
situation proved too much for their resolution, it was exactly what
might have been expected. The initial error of the Federals was in
sending two detached forces, under men of no particular strength of
character, from opposite points of the compass, to converge upon an
enemy who was believed to be superior to either of them. Jackson at
once recognised the blunder, and foreseeing the consequences that
were certain to ensue, resolved to profit by them. His escape, then,
was the reward of his own sagacity.

When once the actual position of the Confederates had been
determined, and the dread that reinforcements were coming down the
Valley had passed away, the vigour of the Federal pursuit left
nothing to be desired.

June 1.

Directly it was found that the Confederates had gone south, on the
afternoon of June 1, Shields was directed on Luray, and that night
his advanced guard was ten miles beyond Front Royal; on the other
side of the Massanuttons, Fremont, with Bayard's cavalry heading his
advance, moved rapidly on Woodstock.

The Federal generals, however, had to do with a foe who never relaxed
his vigilance. Whilst Ashby and Ewell, on May 31, were engaged with
Fremont at Cedar Creek, Jackson had expected that Shields would
advance on Strasburg. But not a single infantry soldier was observed
on the Front Royal road throughout the day. Such inaction was
suspicious, and the probabil