to prevent Banks from detaching troops to
reinforce McClellan. To attain an object in war the first
consideration is to make no mistakes yourself; the next, to take
instant advantage of those made by your opponent. But compliance with
this rule does not embrace the whole art of generalship. The enemy
may be too discreet to commit himself to risky manoeuvres. If the
campaigns of the great masters of war are examined, it will be found
that they but seldom adopted a quiescent attitude, but by one means
or another, by acting on their adversary's morale, or by creating
false impressions, they induced him to make a false step, and to
place himself in a position which made it easy for them to attain
their object. The greatest general has been defined as "he who makes
the fewest mistakes;" but "he who compels his adversary to make the
most mistakes" is a definition of equal force; and it may even be
questioned whether the general whose imagination is unequal to the
stratagems which bring mistakes about is worthy of the name. He may
be a trustworthy subordinate, but he can scarcely become a great
leader.
Johnston had advised, when, at the beginning of March, the retreat of
the Confederates from Winchester was determined on, that Jackson
should fall back on Front Royal, and thence, if necessary, up the
South Fork of the Shenandoah. His force would thus be in close
communication with the main army behind the Rapidan; and it was
contrary, in the General-in-Chief's opinion, to all sound discretion
to permit the enemy to attain a point, such as Front Royal, which
would render it possible for him to place himself between them.
Jackson, however, declared his preference for a retreat up the North
Fork, in the direction of Staunton. Why should Banks join McClellan
at all? McClellan, so Jackson calculated, had already more men with
him than he could feed; and he believed, therefore, that Staunton
would be Banks' objective, because, by seizing that town, he would
threaten Edward Johnson's rear, open the way for Fremont, and then,
crossing the Blue Ridge, place himself so near the communications of
the main army with Richmond that it would be compelled to fall back
to defend them. Nor, in any case, did he agree with Johnston that the
occupation of Front Royal would prevent Banks leaving the Valley and
marching to Manassas. Twenty miles due east of Winchester is
Snicker's Gap, where a good road crosses the Blue Ridge, and eight
miles sou
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