th another turnpike leads over Ashby's Gap. By either of
these Banks could reach Manassas just as rapidly as Jackson could
join Johnston; and, while 4500 men could scarcely be expected to
detain 20,000, they might very easily be cut off by a portion of the
superior force.

If a junction with the main army were absolutely necessary, Jackson
was of opinion that the move ought to be made at once, and the Valley
abandoned. If, on the other hand, it was desirable to keep Banks and
McClellan separated, the best means of doing so was to draw the
former up the North Fork; and at Mount Jackson, covering the New
Market to Luray road, the Valley troops would be as near the Rapidan
as if they were at Front Royal.* (* Dabney volume 2 pages 22 and 23.
O.R. volume 5 page 1087.) The strategical advantages which such a
position would offer--the isolation of the troops pursuing him, the
chance of striking their communications from the South Fork Valley,
and, if reinforcements were granted, of cutting off their retreat by
a rapid movement from Luray to Winchester--were always present to
Jackson's mind.* (* Cf letters of April 5. O.R. volume 12 part 3
pages 843 and 844.)

An additional argument was that at the time when these alternatives
were discussed the road along South Fork was so bad as to make
marching difficult; and it was to this rather than to Jackson's
strategical conceptions that Johnston appears to have ultimately
yielded.

Be this as it may, the sum of Jackson's operations was satisfactory
in the extreme. On March 27 he had written to Johnston, "I will try
and draw the enemy on." On April 16 Banks was exactly where he wished
him, well up the North Fork of the Shenandoah, cut off by the
Massanuttons from Manassas, and by the Alleghanies from Fremont. The
two detachments which held the Valley, his own force at Mount
Jackson, and Edward Johnson's 2800 on the Shenandoah Mountain, were
in close communication, and could at any time, if permitted by the
higher authorities, combine against either of the columns which
threatened Staunton. "What I desire," he said to Mr. Boteler, a
friend in the Confederate Congress, "is to hold the country, as far
as practicable, until we are in a condition to advance; and then,
with God's blessing, let us make thorough work of it. But let us
start right."

On April 7 he wrote to his wife as follows:--

"Your sickness gives me great concern; but so live that it and all
your tribulations may be