well to himself, and to carry out
the project on which his heart was set, he still kept in view the
general situation. After he had dispatched the above letter, a report
came in which led him to believe that Ewell was more needed on the
Rappahannock than in the Valley. Lee had already informed him that
McDowell's advanced guard had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank of
the river, opposite Fredericksburg, on April 19, and that General
Field had fallen back.

Jackson, in consequence, permitted Ewell to remain near Gordonsville,
close to the railway; assuring Lee that "he would make arrangements
so as not to be disappointed should Ewell be ordered to
Fredericksburg."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 pages 863 and 864.)

Nor was this the only instance in which he demonstrated his breadth
of view. In planning co-operation with Ewell, that general had
suggested that he should take a different road to that which had been
recommended by General Johnston, should necessity for a combined
movement arise. Jackson protested against the route being altered.
"General Johnston," he wrote, "does not state why he desires you to
go (by this road), but it may be for the purpose of deceiving the
enemy with regard to your ultimate destination, to be more distant
from the enemy during the movement, and also to be in a more
favourable position for reinforcing some other points should it be
necessary." The interests of his own force, here as always, were
subordinated to those of the army which was defending Richmond.

April 25.

The next information received from General Lee was that the enemy was
collecting in strong force at Fredericksburg. "For this purpose," he
wrote, "they must weaken other points, and now is the time to
concentrate on any that may be exposed within our reach." He then
suggested that, if Banks was too strong in numbers and position,
Jackson and Ewell combined should move on Warrenton, where a Federal
force was reported; or that Ewell and Field should attack
Fredericksburg. "The blow," he added, "wherever struck, must, to be
successful, be sudden and heavy. The troops must be efficient and
light. I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations
depending on circumstances unknown to me, and requiring the exercise
of discretion and judgment as to time and execution, but submit these
ideas for your consideration."* (* Jackson himself showed the same
wise self-restraint. In his communications with Ewell, after that
offic