the Blue Ridge, steep, pathless, and densely
wooded, covered either flank. The front, protected by the Shenandoah,
was very strong. Communication with both Ewell and Richmond was
secure, and so long as he held the bridge at Conrad's store he
threatened the flank of the Federals should they advance on Staunton.
Strategically the position was by no means perfect. The Confederates,
to use an expression of General Grant's, applied to a similar
situation, were "in a bottle." A bold enemy would have seized the
bridge, "corking up" Jackson with a strong detachment, and have
marched on Staunton with his main body.

"Had Banks been more enterprising," says Dabney, "this objection
would have been decisive." But he was not enterprising, and Jackson
knew it.* (* "My own opinion," he wrote, when this movement was in
contemplation, "is that Banks will not follow me up to the Blue
Ridge. My desire is, as far as practicable, to hold the Valley, and I
hope that Banks will be deterred from advancing [from New Market]
much further toward Staunton by the apprehension of my returning to
New Market [by Luray], and thus getting in his rear." O.R. volume 12
part 3 page 848.) He had had opportunities in plenty of judging his
opponent's character. The slow advance on Winchester, the long delay
at Woodstock, the cautious approach to New Market, had revealed
enough. It was a month since the battle of Kernstown, and yet the
Confederate infantry, although for the greater part of the time they
had been encamped within a few miles of the enemy's outposts, had not
fired a shot.

The tardy progress of the Federals from Woodstock to Harrisonburg had
been due rather to the perplexities of their commander than to the
difficulties of supply; and Banks had got clear of the Massanuttons
only to meet with fresh embarrassments. Jackson's move to Elk Run
Valley was a complete checkmate. His opponent felt that he was
dangerously exposed. McClellan had not yet begun his advance on
Richmond; and, so long as that city was secure from immediate attack,
the Confederates could spare men to reinforce Jackson. The railway
ran within easy reach of Swift Run Gap, and the troops need not be
long absent from the capital. Ewell, too, with a force of unknown
strength, was not far distant. Banks could expect no help from
Fremont. Both generals were anxious to work together, and plans had
been submitted to Washington which would probably have secured the
capture of Staunton a