ey had
marched over fifty miles. Banks followed with his customary caution,
and when, on the 17th, his cavalry occupied New Market he was
congratulated by the Secretary of War on his "brilliant and
successful operations." On the 19th he led a detachment across the
Massanuttons, and seized the two bridges over the South Fork at
Luray, driving back a squadron which Jackson had sent to burn them.
April 22.
On the night of the 22nd his cavalry reached Harrisonburg, and he
reported that want of supplies alone prevented him from bringing the
Confederates to bay.
April 26.
On the 26th he sent two of his five brigades to Harrisonburg, the
remainder halting at New Market, and for the last few days, according
to his own dispatches, beef, flour, and forage had been abundant. Yet
it had taken him ten days to march five-and-thirty miles.
April 20.
On April 20 General Edward Johnson, menaced in rear by Banks'
advance, in flank by the brigade which Fremont had placed at
Moorefield, and in front by Milroy's brigade, which had advanced from
Monterey, had fallen back from the Shenandoah Mountain to West View,
seven miles west of Staunton; and to all appearance the Federal
prospects were exceedingly favourable.
Harrisonburg is five-and-twenty miles, or two short marches, north of
Staunton. The hamlet of M'Dowell, now occupied by Milroy, is
seven-and-twenty miles north-west. Proper concert between Banks and
Fremont should therefore have ensured the destruction or retreat of
Edward Johnson, and have placed Staunton, as well as the Virginia
Central Railroad, in their hands. But although not a single picket
stood between his outposts and Staunton, Banks dared not move. By
moving to Elk Run Valley Jackson had barred the way of the Federals
more effectively than if he had intrenched his troops across the
Staunton road.
South of Harrisonburg, where the Valley widens to five-and-twenty
miles, there was no strong position. And even had such existed, 6000
men, of which a third were cavalry, could scarcely have hoped to hold
it permanently against a far superior force. Moreover, cooped up
inside intrenchments, the Army of the Valley would have lost all
freedom of action; and Jackson would have been cut off both from
Ewell and from Richmond. But, although direct intervention was
impracticable, he was none the less resolved that Banks should never
set foot in Staunton. The Elk Run Valley was well adapted for his
purpose. Spurs of
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