under
adverse circumstances. Nor is Kimball to be blamed that he did not
throw greater weight on Jackson's turning column at an earlier hour.
Like Shields and Banks, he was unable to believe that Jackson was
unsupported. He expected that the flank attack would be followed up
by one in superior numbers from the front. He could hardly credit
that an inferior force would deliberately move off to a flank,
leaving its line of retreat to be guarded by a few squadrons, weakly
supported by infantry; and the audacity of the assailant had the
usual effect of deceiving the defender.

Kernstown, moreover, will rank as an example of what determined men
can do against superior numbers. The Confederates on the ridge,
throughout the greater part of the fight, hardly exceeded 2000
muskets. They were assailed by 3000, and proved a match for them. The
3000 were then reinforced by at least 3000 more, whilst Jackson could
bring up only 600 muskets to support an already broken line.
Nevertheless, these 6000 Northerners were so roughly handled that
there was practically no pursuit. When the Confederates fell back
every one of the Federal regiments had been engaged, and there were
no fresh troops wherewith to follow them. Jackson was perfectly
justified in reporting that "Night and an indisposition of the enemy
to press further terminated the battle."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 1
page 382.)

But the action was attended by features more remarkable than the
stubborn resistance of the Virginia regiments. It is seldom that a
battle so insignificant as Kernstown has been followed by such
extraordinary results. Fortune indeed favoured the Confederates. At
the time of the battle a large portion of McClellan's army was at
sea, and the attack was delivered at the very moment when it was most
dreaded by the Northern Government. Nor was it to the disadvantage of
the Southerners that the real head of the Federal army was the
President, and that his strategical conceptions were necessarily
subservient to the attitude of the Northern people. These were
circumstances purely fortuitous, and it might seem, therefore, that
Jackson merely blundered into success. But he must be given full
credit for recognizing that a blow at Banks might be fraught with
most important consequences. It was with other ideas than defeating a
rear-guard or detaining Banks that he seized the Kernstown ridge. He
was not yet aware of McClellan's plan of invasion by sea; but he knew
wel