ion of 6000
men supported by four squadrons.* (* The morning after the battle one
of the Confederate officers expressed the opinion that even if the
counterstroke had been successful, the Federal reserves would have
arrested it. Jackson answered, "No, if I had routed the men on the
ridge, they would all have gone off together.")
Tactical unity and morale are factors of far more importance in
battle than mere numerical strength. Troops that have been hotly
engaged, even with success, and whose nerves are wrought up to a high
state of tension, are peculiarly susceptible to surprise. If they
have lost their order, and the men find themselves under strange
officers, with unfamiliar faces beside them, the counterstroke falls
with even greater force. It is at such moments that cavalry still
finds its opportunity. It is at such moments that a resolute charge,
pushed home with drums beating and a loud cheer, may have
extraordinary results. On August 6, 1870, on the heights of Worth, a
German corps d'armee, emerging, after three hours' fierce fighting,
from the great wood on McMahon's flank, bore down upon the last
stronghold of the French. The troops were in the utmost confusion.
Divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies were mingled in one
motley mass. But the enemy was retreating; a heavy force of artillery
was close at hand, and the infantry must have numbered at least
10,000 rifles. Suddenly three battalions of Turcos, numbering no more
than 1500 bayonets, charged with wild cries, and without firing, down
the grassy slope. The Germans halted, fired a few harmless volleys,
and then, turning as one man, bolted to the shelter of the wood,
twelve hundred yards in rear.
According to an officer of the 14th Indiana, the Federals at
Kernstown were in much the same condition as the Germans at Worth.
"The Confederates fell back in great disorder, and we advanced in
disorder just as great. Over logs, through woods, over hills and
fields, the brigades, regiments, and companies advanced, in one
promiscuous, mixed, and uncontrollable mass. Officers shouted
themselves hoarse in trying to bring order out of confusion, but all
their efforts were unavailing along the front line, or rather what
ought to have been the front line."* (* Colonel E.H.C. Cavins,
Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 307.)
Garnett's conduct was not the only incident connected with Kernstown
that troubled Jackson. March 23 was a Sunday. "You appear much
conce
|