ength by
40,000. The curious misconceptions under which the Germans commenced
the battles of Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte will also
occur to the military reader.) Ashby had done his best. Although the
Federals had 780 cavalry present, and every approach to Winchester
was strongly picketed, his scouts had pushed within the Federal
lines, and had communicated with the citizens of Winchester. Their
reports were confirmed, according to Jackson's despatch, "from a
source which had been remarkable for its reliability," and for the
last two days a retrograde movement towards Snicker's Gap had been
reported. The ground, it is true, favoured an ambush. But the
strategic situation demanded instant action. McClellan's advanced
guard was within fifty miles of Johnston's position on the Rapidan,
and a few days' march might bring the main armies into collision. If
Jackson was to bring Banks back to the Valley, and himself join
Johnston before the expected battle, he had no time to spare.
Moreover, the information to hand was quite sufficient to justify him
in trusting something to fortune. Even a defeat, if the attack were
resolutely pushed, might have the best effect.

The third reproach, that Jackson disobeyed orders, can hardly be
sustained. He was in command of a detached force operating at a
distance from the main army, and Johnston, with a wise discretion,
had given him not orders, but instructions; that is, the
general-in-chief had merely indicated the purpose for which Jackson's
force had been detached, and left to his judgment the manner in which
that purpose was to be achieved. Johnston had certainly suggested
that he should not expose himself to the danger of defeat. But when
it became clear that he could not retain the enemy in the Valley
unless he closed with him, to have refrained from attack would have
been to disobey the spirit of his instructions.

Again, when Jackson attacked he had good reason to believe that he
ran no risk of defeat whatever. The force before him was reported as
inferior to his own, and he might well have argued: "To confine
myself to observation will be to confess my weakness, and Banks is
not likely to arrest his march to Manassas because of the presence of
an enemy who dare not attack an insignificant rearguard."
Demonstrations, such as Johnston had advised, may undoubtedly serve a
temporary purpose, but if protracted the enemy sees through them. On
the 22nd, for instance, it was