w, as also did Jackson, that even a mere demonstration against
so vital a point might have the most deplorable effect. Whatever line
of invasion, he asked, might be adopted, let it be one that would
cover Washington.

Lincoln's remonstrances, however, had no great weight with McClellan.
The general paid little heed to the political situation. His chief
argument in favour of the expedition by sea had been the strength of
the fortifications at Manassas. Johnston's retreat on March 9 removed
this obstacle from his path; but although he immediately marched his
whole army in pursuit, he still remained constant to his favourite
idea. The road to Richmond from Washington involved a march of one
hundred miles, over a difficult country, with a single railway as the
line of supply. The route from the coast, although little shorter,
was certainly easier. Fortress Monroe had remained in Federal hands.
Landing under the shelter of its guns, he would push forward, aided
by the navy, to West Point, the terminus of the York River Railroad,
within thirty miles of Richmond, transporting his supplies by water.
Washington, with the garrison he would leave behind, would in his
opinion be quite secure. The Confederates would be compelled to
concentrate for the defence of their capital, and a resolute
endeavour on their part to cross the Potomac was forbidden by every
rule of strategy. Had not Johnston, in his retreat, burnt the railway
bridges? Could there be a surer indication that he had no intention
of returning?

Such was McClellan's reasoning, and, putting politics aside, it was
perfectly sound. Lincoln reluctantly yielded, and on March 17 the
Army of the Potomac, withdrawing by successive divisions from
Centreville to Alexandria, began its embarkation for the Peninsula,
the region, in McClellan's words, "of sandy roads and short land
transportation."* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 7.) The vessels
assembled at Alexandria could only carry 10,000 men, thus involving
at least fifteen voyages to and fro. Yet the Commander-in-Chief was
full of confidence. To the little force in the Shenandoah Valley,
flying southward before Shields, he gave no thought. It would have
been nothing short of miraculous had he even suspected that 4500 men,
under a professor of the higher mathematics, might bring to naught
the operations of his gigantic host. Jackson was not even to be
followed. Of Banks' three divisions, Shields', Sedgwick's, and
Williams', th