ual strength. His
intelligence department, controlled, not by a trained staff officer,
but by a well-known detective, estimated Johnston's force at 115,000
men. In reality, including the detachment on the Shenandoah, it at no
time exceeded 50,000. But for all this there was no reason whatever
for absolute inactivity. The capture of the batteries which barred
the entrance to the Potomac, the defeat of the Confederate
detachments along the river, the occupation of Winchester or of
Leesburg, were all feasible operations. By such means the impatience
of the Northern people might have been assuaged. A few successes,
even on a small scale, would have raised the morale of the troops and
have trained them to offensive movements. The general would have
retained the confidence of the Administration, and have secured the
respect of his opponents. Jackson had set him the example. His winter
expeditions had borne fruit. The Federal generals opposed to him gave
him full credit for activity. "Much dissatisfaction was expressed by
the troops," says one of Banks' brigadiers, "that Jackson was
permitted to get away from Winchester without a fight, and but little
heed was paid to my assurances that this chieftain would be apt,
before the war closed, to give us an entertainment up to the utmost
of our aspirations."* (* General G.H. Gordon.)

It was not only of McClellan's inactivity that the Government
complained. At the end of February he submitted a plan of operations
to the President, and with that plan Mr. Lincoln totally disagreed.
McClellan, basing his project on the supposition that Johnston had
100,000 men behind formidable intrenchments at Manassas, blocking the
road to Richmond, proposed to transfer 150,000 men to the Virginia
coast by sea; and landing either at Urbanna on the Rappahannock, or
at Fortress Monroe on the Yorktown peninsula, to intervene between
the Confederate army and Richmond, and possibly to capture the
Southern capital before Johnston could get back to save it.

The plan at first sight seemed promising. But in Lincoln's eyes it
had this great defect: during the time McClellan was moving round by
water and disembarking his troops--and this, so few were the
transports, would take at least a month--Johnston might make a dash
at Washington. The city had been fortified. A cordon of detached
forts surrounded it on a circumference of thirty miles. The Potomac
formed an additional protection. But a cordon of isolated