ntually ruined his campaign,
is a strategical lesson of the highest import.

From the day McClellan took command the Army of the Potomac had done
practically nothing. Throughout the winter troops had poured into
Washington at the rate of 40,000 a month. At the end of December
there were 148,000 men fit for duty. On March 20 the grand aggregate
was 240,000.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 26.) But during the
winter no important enterprise had been undertaken. The colours of
the rebels were still flaunting within sight of the forts of
Washington, and the mouth of the Potomac was securely closed by
Confederate batteries. With a mighty army at their service it is
little wonder that the North became restive and reproached their
general. It is doubtless true that the first thing needful was
organisation. To discipline and consolidate the army so as to make
success assured was unquestionably the wiser policy. The impatience
of a sovereign people, ignorant of war, is not to be lightly yielded
to. At the same time, the desire of a nation cannot be altogether
disregarded. A general who obstinately refuses to place himself in
accord with the political situation forfeits the confidence of his
employers and the cordial support of the Administration. The cry
throughout the North was for action. The President took it upon
himself to issue a series of orders. The army was ordered to advance
on February 22, a date chosen because it was Washington's birthday,
just as the third and most disastrous assault on Plevna was delivered
on the "name-day" of the Czar. McClellan secured delay. His plans
were not yet ripe. The Virginia roads were still impassable. The
season was not yet sufficiently advanced for active operations, and
that his objections were well founded it is impossible to deny. The
prospect of success depended much upon the weather. Virginia, covered
in many places with dense forests, crossed by many rivers, and with
most indifferent communications, is a most difficult theatre of war,
and the amenities of the Virginian spring are not to be lightly
faced. Napoleon's fifth element, "mud," is a most disturbing factor
in military calculations. It is related that a Federal officer, sent
out to reconnoitre a road in a certain district of Virginia, reported
that the road was there, but that he guessed "the bottom had fallen
out." Moreover, McClellan had reason to believe that the Confederate
army at Manassas was more than double its act