es which serve in a
street-brawl are all that is necessary to make a general. Nor were
historical precedents wanting for the mistakes of the American
statesmen. In both the Peninsula and the Crimea, lives, treasure, and
prestige were as recklessly wasted as in Virginia; and staff officers
who owed their positions to social influence alone, generals, useless
and ignorant, who succeeded to responsible command by virtue of
seniority and a long purse, were the standing curse of the English
army. At the same time, it may well be questioned whether some of the
regular officers would have done better than Banks. He was no fool,
and if he had not studied the art of war, there have been
barrack-square generals who have showed as much ignorance without
one-quarter his ability. Natural commonsense has often a better
chance of success than a rusty brain, and a mind narrowed by routine.
After serving in twenty campaigns Frederick the Great's mules were
still mules. On this very theatre of war, in the forests beyond
Romney, an English general had led a detachment of English soldiers
to a defeat as crushing as it was disgraceful, and Braddock was a
veteran of many wars. Here, too, Patterson, an officer of Volunteers
who had seen much service, had allowed Johnston to slip away and join
Beauregard on Bull Run. The Northern people, in good truth, had as
yet no reason to place implicit confidence in the leading of trained
soldiers. They had yet to learn that mere length of service is no
test whatever of capacity for command, and that character fortified
by knowledge is the only charm which attracts success.
Jackson had already some acquaintance with Banks. During the Romney
expedition the latter had been posted at Frederick with 16,000 men,
and a more enterprising commander would at least have endeavoured to
thwart the Confederate movements. Banks, supine in his camps, made
neither threat nor demonstration. Throughout the winter, Ashby's
troopers had ridden unmolested along the bank of the Potomac. Lander
alone had worried the Confederate outposts, driven in their advanced
detachments, and drawn supplies from the Virginian farms. Banks had
been over-cautious and inactive, and Jackson had not failed to note
his characteristics.
March 9.
Up to March 9 the Federal general, keeping his cavalry in rear, had
pushed forward no farther than Charlestown and Bunker Hill. On that
day the news reached McClellan that the Confederates were prepa
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