ng troops suddenly from Manassas. Why
should the bare idea that reinforcements were coming up embarrass the
Federals?

The letter itself does not indeed supply a definite answer. Jackson
was always most guarded in his correspondence; and, if he could
possibly avoid it, he never made the slightest allusion to the
information on which his plans were based. His staff officers,
however, after the campaign was over, were generally enlightened as
to the motive of his actions, and we are thus enabled to fill the
gap.* (* Letter from Major Hotchkiss to the author.) Jackson demanded
reinforcements for the one reason that a blow struck near Winchester
would cause alarm in Washington. The communications of the Federal
capital with both the North and West passed through or close to
Harper's Ferry; and the passage over the Potomac, which Banks was now
covering, was thus the most sensitive point in the invader's front.
Well aware, as indeed was every statesman and every general in
Virginia, of the state of public feeling in the North, Jackson saw
with more insight than others the effect that was likely to be
produced should the Government, the press, and the people of the
Federal States have reason to apprehend that the capital of the Union
was in danger.

If the idea of playing on the fears of his opponents by means of the
weak detachment under Jackson ever suggested itself to Johnston, he
may be forgiven if he dismissed it as chimerical. For 7600 men* (*
Jackson, 4600; Hill, 3000.) to threaten with any useful result a
capital which was defended by 250,000 seemed hardly within the bounds
of practical strategy. Johnston had nevertheless determined to turn
the situation to account. In order to protect the passages of the
Upper Potomac, McClellan had been compelled to disseminate his army.
Between his main body south of Washington and his right wing under
Banks was a gap of fifty miles, and this separation Johnston was
determined should be maintained. The President, to whom he had
referred Jackson's letter, was unable to spare the reinforcements
therein requested, and the defence of the Valley was left to the 4600
men encamped at Winchester. Jackson was permitted to use his own
judgment as to his own position, but something more was required of
him than the mere protection of a tract of territory. "He was to
endeavour to employ the invaders in the Valley without exposing
himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy