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On November 2nd, the 16th French Corps and Conneau's French Cavalry
Division were holding the Wytschaete--Messines ridge, with a
detachment of our 1st Cavalry Division supporting Conneau.
The troops who had fought so well on the 1st were absolutely tired
out. They had suffered tremendous casualties and could not be counted
on for the moment even as a reserve. They were withdrawn to rest and
refit.
It was with great difficulty that the French troops were able to
maintain themselves on the ridge. The Germans were very active, and
the fight constantly swayed backwards and forwards. The western edge
of the plateau and the outskirts of the villages marked the
extreme limit of the Allied advance line.
For some days I had felt considerable anxiety as to the condition of
the 1st Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions and the 7th Division).
I had constant messages from Haig asking that his tired troops might
be given some rest after all their hard work; but I was driven almost
to my wits' end to find means of giving him the relief he sought. His
Chief of Staff (John Gough) came to my advanced Headquarters at
Bailleul and discussed the subject fully with me.
I thought perhaps Foch might be able to help me; but when I went to
interview him he said that, whilst the present crisis lasted, he could
not spare a single man for this purpose. All I could do was to send
two very tired brigades of the 2nd Corps up to Ypres on the morning of
the 5th to relieve the 7th Division, who then came back into billets
round Locre in a shattered condition.
The next day the remainder of the 2nd Corps (which was resting)
followed to Ypres to afford what further relief was possible to the
1st Corps. The 2nd Corps was now scattered in detachments along the
whole line, and the only reserves available were two or three lately
arrived Territorial Battalions and the worn-out 7th Division, reduced
to less than a brigade in strength.
Willcocks about this time felt anxiety as to the line his Indian
troops were holding, and sent his Chief of Staff to me at Bailleul to
ask if he could be reinforced. Under the conditions then existing, I
was most anxious that the Indian Corps should hold its own without
assistance and, after calling into consultation other officers of
great Indian experience, I refused to do so, pointing out that he had
four battalions of the 2nd Corps in close reserve behind him.
My faith in the Indian
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