tation of consequences. The
agent's 'intention' is defined by the consequences actually
contemplated. The cause of action is the hope of the consequent
pleasures or the dread of the consequent pains. This anticipated
pleasure or pain constitutes the 'internal motive' (a phrase used by
Bentham to exclude the 'external motive' or event which causes the
anticipation).[396] The motive, or 'internal motive,' is the
anticipation of pain to be avoided or pleasure to be gained. Actions are
good or bad simply and solely as they are on the whole 'productive of a
balance of pleasure or pain.' The problem of the legislator is how to
regulate actions so as to incline the balance to the right side. His
weapons are 'sanctions' which modify 'motives.' What motives, then,
should be strengthened or checked? Here we must be guided by a principle
which is, in fact, the logical result of the doctrines already laid
down. We are bound to apply our 'felicific calculus' with absolute
impartiality. We must therefore assign equal value to all motives. 'No
motives,' he says,[397] are 'constantly good or constantly bad.'
Pleasure is itself a good; pain itself an evil: nay, they are 'the only
good and the only evil.' This is true of every sort of pain and
pleasure, even of the pains and pleasures of illwill. The pleasures of
'malevolence' are placed in his 'table' by the side of pleasures of
'benevolence.' Hence it 'follows immediately and incontestably, that
there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad
one.' The doctrine is no doubt a logical deduction from Bentham's
assumptions, and he proceeds to illustrate its meaning. A 'motive'
corresponds to one of his 'springs of action.' He shows how every one of
the motives included in his table may lead either to good or to bad
consequences. The desire of wealth may lead me to kill a man's enemy or
to plough his field for him; the fear of God may prompt to fanaticism
or to charity; illwill may lead to malicious conduct or may take the
form of proper 'resentment,' as, for example, when I secure the
punishment of my father's murderer. Though one act, he says, is approved
and the other condemned, they spring from the same motive, namely,
illwill.[398] He admits, however, that some motives are more likely than
others to lead to 'useful' conduct; and thus arranges them in a certain
'order of pre-eminence.'[399] It is obvious that 'goodwill,' 'love of
reputation,' and the 'desire of amity
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