' are more likely than others to
promote general happiness. 'The dictates of utility,' as he observes,
are simply the 'dictates of the most extensive and enlightened (that is,
_well advised_) benevolence.' It would, therefore, seem more appropriate
to call the 'motive' good; though no one doubts that when directed by an
erroneous judgment it may incidentally be mischievous.

The doctrine that morality depends upon 'consequences' and not upon
'motives' became a characteristic Utilitarian dogma, and I shall have to
return to the question. Meanwhile, it was both a natural and, I think,
in some senses, a correct view, when strictly confined to the province
of legislation. For reasons too obvious to expand, the legislator must
often be indifferent to the question of motives. He cannot know with
certainty what are a man's motives. He must enforce the law whatever may
be the motives for breaking it; and punish rebellion, for example, even
if he attributes it to misguided philanthropy. He can, in any case,
punish only such crimes as are found out; and must define crimes by
palpable 'external' marks. He must punish by such coarse means as the
gallows and the gaol: for his threats must appeal to the good and the
bad alike. He depends, therefore, upon 'external' sanctions, sanctions,
that is, which work mainly upon the fears of physical pain; and even if
his punishments affect the wicked alone, they clearly cannot reach the
wicked as wicked, nor in proportion to their wickedness. That is quite
enough to show why in positive law motives are noticed indirectly or not
at all. It shows also that the analogy between the positive and the
moral law is treacherous. The exclusion of motive justifiable in law may
take all meaning out of morality. The Utilitarians, as we shall see,
were too much disposed to overlook the difference, and attempt to apply
purely legal doctrine in the totally uncongenial sphere of ethical
speculation. To accept the legal classification of actions by their
external characteristics is, in fact, to beg the question in advance.
Any outward criterion must group together actions springing from
different 'motives' and therefore, as other moralists would say,
ethically different.

There is, however, another meaning in this doctrine which is more to the
purpose here. Bentham was aiming at a principle which, true or false, is
implied in all ethical systems based upon experience instead of pure
logic or _a priori_ 'intuit