erious importance; and he then asks how the work might be
done more cheaply. As a clergyman's only duty is to read weekly services
and preach sermons, he suggests (whether seriously may be doubted) that
this might be done as well by teaching a parish boy to read properly,
and provide him with the prayer-book and the homilies.[477] A great deal
of expense would be saved. This, again, seems to have led him to attack
St. Paul, whom he took to be responsible for dogmatic theology, and
therefore for the catechism; and he cross-examines the apostle, and
confronts his various accounts of the conversion with a keenness worthy
of a professional lawyer. In one of the MSS. at University College the
same method is applied to the gospels. Bentham was clearly not capable
of anticipating Renan. From these studies he was led to the far more
interesting book, published under the name of _Philip Beauchamp_.
Bentham supplied the argument in part; but to me it seems clear that it
owes so much to the editor, Grote, that it may more fitly be discussed
hereafter.

The limitations and defects of Bentham's doctrine have been made
abundantly evident by later criticism. They were due partly to his
personal character, and partly to the intellectual and special
atmosphere in which he was brought up. But it is more important to
recognise the immense real value of his doctrine. Briefly, I should say,
that there is hardly an argument in Bentham's voluminous writings which
is not to the purpose so far as it goes. Given his point of view, he is
invariably cogent and relevant. And, moreover, that is a point of view
which has to be taken. No ethical or political doctrine can, as I hold,
be satisfactory which does not find a place for Bentham, though he was
far, indeed, from giving a complete theory of his subject. And the main
reason of this is that which I have already indicated. Bentham's whole
life was spent in the attempt to create a science of legislation. Even
where he is most tiresome, there is a certain interest in his unflagging
working out of every argument, and its application to all conceivable
cases. It is all genuine reasoning; and throughout it is dominated by a
respect for good solid facts. His hatred of 'vague generalities'[478]
means that he will be content with no formula which cannot be
interpreted in terms of definite facts. The resolution to insist upon
this should really be characteristic of every writer upon similar
subjects, and n