om those
which determine more superficial relations. Society is undoubtedly
useful, and its utility may be regarded as its ground. But the utility
of society means much more than the utility of a railway company or a
club, which postulates as existing a whole series of already established
institutions. To Bentham an 'utility' appeared to be a kind of permanent
and ultimate entity which is the same at all periods--it corresponds to
a psychological currency of constant value. To show, therefore, that the
social contract recognises 'utility' is to show that the whole organism
is constructed just as any particular part is constructed. Man comes
first and 'society' afterwards. I have already noticed how this applies
to his statements about the utility of a law; how his argument assumes
an already constituted society, and seems to overlook the difference
between the organic law upon which all order essentially depends, and
some particular modification or corollary which may be superinduced. We
now have to notice the political version of the same method. The 'law,'
according to Bentham, is a rule enforced by a 'sanction.' The imposer of
the rule in the phrase which Hobbes had made famous is the 'sovereign.'
Hobbes was a favourite author, indeed, of the later Utilitarians, though
Bentham does not appear to have studied him. The relation is one of
natural affinity. When in the _Constitutional Code_ Bentham transfers
the 'sovereignty' from the king to the 'people,'[461] he shows the
exact difference between his doctrine and that of the _Leviathan_. Both
thinkers are absolutists in principle, though Hobbes gives to a monarch
the power which Bentham gives to a democracy. The attributes remain
though their subject is altered. The 'sovereign,' in fact, is the
keystone of the whole Utilitarian system. He represents the ultimate
source of all authority, and supplies the motive for all obedience. As
Hobbes put it, he is a kind of mortal God.
Mill's criticism of Bentham suggests the consequences. There are, he
says,[462] three great questions: What government is for the good of the
people? How are they to be induced to obey it? How is it to be made
responsible? The third question, he says, is the only one seriously
considered by Bentham; and Bentham's answer, we have seen, leads to that
'tyranny of the majority' which was Mill's great stumbling-block. Why,
then, does Bentham omit the other questions? or rather, how would he
answer them?
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