m hoped to
make his machinery equally effective in the case of pauperism. A system
of national education is also included in his ideal constitution. It is,
in fact, important to remember that the 'individualism' of Benthamism
does not necessarily coincide with an absolute restriction of government
interference. The general tendency was in that direction; and in purely
economical questions, scarcely any exception was admitted to the rule.
Men are the best judges, it was said, of their own interest; and the
interference of rulers in a commercial transaction is the interference
of people inferior in knowledge of the facts, and whose interests are
'sinister' or inconsistent with those of the persons really concerned.
Utility, therefore, will, as a rule, forbid the action of government:
but, as utility is always the ultimate principle, and there may be cases
in which it does not coincide with the 'let alone' principle, we must
always admit the possibility that in special cases government can
interfere usefully, and, in that case, approve the interference.

Hence we have the ethical application of these theories. The
individualist position naturally tends to take the form of egoism. The
moral sentiments, whatever they may be, are clearly an intrinsic part of
the organic social instincts. They are intimately involved in the whole
process of social evolution. But this view corresponds precisely to the
conditions which Bentham overlooks. The individual is already there. The
moral and the legal sanctions are 'external'; something imposed by the
action of others; corresponding to 'coercion,' whether by physical force
or the dread of public opinion; and, in any case, an accretion or
addition, not a profound modification of his whole nature. The
Utilitarian 'man' therefore inclines to consider other people as merely
parts of the necessary machinery. Their feelings are relevant only as
influencing their outward conduct. If a man gives me a certain 'lot' of
pain or pleasure, it does not matter what may be his motives. The
'motive' for all conduct corresponds in all cases to the pain or
pleasure accruing to the agent. It is true that his happiness will be
more or less affected by his relations to others. But as conduct is
ruled by a calculation of the balance of pains or pleasures dependent
upon any course of action, it simplifies matters materially, if each man
regards his neighbour's feelings simply as instrumental, not
intrinsically