d pleasures. 'Fictitious' as they may be, therefore, the
fiction enables us to express real truths, and to state facts which are
of the highest importance to the moralist and the legislator. Bentham
discusses some cases of casuistry in order to show the relation between
the tendency of an action and the intention and motives of the agent.
Ravaillac murders a good king; Ravaillac's son enables his father to
escape punishment, or conveys poison to his father to enable him to
avoid torture by suicide.[401] What is the inference as to the son's
disposition in either case? The solution (as he substantially and, I
think, rightly suggests) will have to be reached by considering whether
the facts indicate that the son's disposition was mischievous or
otherwise; whether it indicates political disloyalty or filial
affection, and so forth, and in what proportions. The most interesting
case perhaps is that of religious persecution, where the religious
motive is taken to be good, and the action to which it leads is yet
admitted to be mischievous. The problem is often puzzling, but we are
virtually making an inference as to the goodness or badness of the
'disposition' implied by the given action under all the supposed
circumstances. This gives what Bentham calls the 'meritoriousness'[402]
of the disposition. The 'intention' is caused by the 'motive.' The
'disposition' is the 'sum of the intentions'; that is to say, it
expresses the agent's sensibility to various classes of motives; and the
merit therefore will be in proportion to the total goodness or badness
of the disposition thus indicated. The question of merit leads to
interesting moral problems. Bentham, however, observes that he is not
here speaking from the point of view of the moralist but of the
legislator. Still, as a legislator he has to consider what is the
'depravity' of disposition indicated by different kinds of conduct. This
consideration is of great importance. The 'disposition' includes
sensibility to what he calls 'tutelary motives'--motives, that is, which
deter a man from such conduct as generally produces mischievous
consequences. No motive can be invariably, though some, especially the
motive of goodwill, and in a minor degree those of 'amity' and a 'love
of reputation,' are generally, on the right side. The legislator has to
reinforce these 'tutelary motives' by 'artificial tutelary motives,' and
mainly by appealing to the 'love of ease,' that is, by making
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