recording judicial and
other official decisions and registering births, deaths, and marriages.
In Books v. and vi. we consider two kinds of evidence which is in one
way or other of inferior cogency, namely, 'circumstantial evidence,' in
which the evidence if accepted still leaves room for a process of more
or less doubtful inference; and 'makeshift evidence,' such evidence as
must sometimes be accepted for want of the best, of which the most
conspicuous instance is 'hearsay evidence.' Book vii. deals with the
'authentication' of evidence. Book viii. is a consideration of the
'technical' system, that namely which was accepted by English lawyers;
and finally Book ix. deals with a special point, namely, the exclusion
of evidence. Bentham announces at starting[419] that he shall establish
'one theorem' and consider two problems. The problems are: 'what
securities can be taken for the truth of evidence?' and 'what rules can
be given for estimating the value of evidence?' The 'theorem' is that no
evidence should be excluded with the professed intention of obtaining a
right decision; though some must be excluded to avoid expense, vexation,
and delay. This, therefore, as his most distinct moral, is fully treated
in the last book.

Had Bentham confined himself to a pithy statement of his leading
doctrines, and confirmed them by a few typical cases, he would have been
more effective in a literary sense. His passion for 'codification,' for
tabulating and arranging facts in all their complexity, and for applying
his doctrine at full length to every case that he can imagine, makes him
terribly prolix. On the other hand, this process no doubt strengthened
his own conviction and the conviction of his disciples as to the value
of his process. Follow this clue of utility throughout the whole
labyrinth, see what a clear answer it offers at every point, and you
cannot doubt that you are in possession of the true compass for such a
navigation. Indeed, it seems to be indisputable that Bentham's arguments
are the really relevant and important arguments. How can we decide any
of the points which come up for discussion? Should a witness be
cross-examined? Should his evidence be recorded? Should a wife be
allowed to give evidence against her husband? or the defendant to give
evidence about his own case? These and innumerable other points can only
be decided by reference to what Bentham understood by 'utility.' This or
that arrangement is 'usef