schievous conduct more difficult, and to 'self-preservation,' that is,
by making it more dangerous.[403] He has therefore to measure the force
by which these motives will be opposed; or, in other words, the
'strength of the temptation.' Now the more depraved a man's disposition,
the weaker the temptation which will seduce him to crime. Consequently
if an act shows depravity, it will require a stronger counter-motive or
a more severe punishment, as the disposition indicated is more
mischievous. An act, for example, which implies deliberation proves a
greater insensibility to these social motives which, as Bentham
remarks,[404] determine the 'general tenor of a man's life,' however
depraved he may be. The legislator is guided solely by 'utility,' or
aims at maximising happiness without reference to its quality. Still, so
far as action implies disposition, he has to consider the depravity as a
source of mischief. The legislator who looks solely at the moral quality
implied is wrong; and, if guided solely by his sympathies, has no
measure for the amount of punishment to be inflicted. These
considerations will enable us to see what is the proper measure of
resentment.[405]

The doctrine of the neutrality or 'unmorality' of motive is thus
sufficiently clear. Bentham's whole aim is to urge that the criterion of
morality is given by the consequences of actions. To say the conduct is
good or bad is to say in other words that it produces a balance of
pleasure or pain. To make the criterion independent, or escape the
vicious circle, we must admit the pleasures and pains to be in
themselves neutral; to have, that is, the same value, if equally strong,
whatever their source. In our final balance-sheet we must set down pains
of illwill and of goodwill, of sense and of intellect with absolute
impartiality, and compare them simply in respect of intensity. We must
not admit a 'conscience' or 'moral sense' which would be autocratic;
nor, indeed, allow moral to have any meaning as applied to the separate
passions. But it is quite consistent with this to admit that some
motives, goodwill in particular, generally tend to bring out the
desirable result, that is, a balance of pleasure for the greatest
number. The pains and pleasures are the ultimate facts, and the
'disposition' is a 'fictitious entity' or a name for the sum of
sensibilities. It represents the fact that some men are more inclined
than others to increase the total of good or ba